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Highlights
• Stress in the interbank market has increased dramatically since July and
bank stock market valuation has fallen by 22 percent on average for 60 of the
most important banks tested in the EBA stress tests.
• I find evidence that bank stock valuation is significantly and economically
meaningfully affected by the bank’s exposure to Greek debt. Greek banks are
particularly affected. Holdings of debt of the other four periphery countries
does not however appear to be a strong determinant of stock price move-
ments. Policy announcements of 21 July of no haircut on any sovereign but
Greece appear to be perceived as credible.
• The exposure to Greece cannot explain the general and large decline in euro
area banks’ market cap. Instead, a general confidence crisis of the euro area
banking system, or more deeply the euro area construction, might be driving
the fall in stock prices.
• The summit of 23 October should focus on restoring confidence in euro-area
policymakers’ ability and determination to put the euro area on a sound
footing. Recapitalisation of banks can only be only one aspect. A credible
solution to Greece and a way forward for the larger institutional set-up,
including a federal fiscal back-stop of the banking system, are of at least equal
importance.
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1. Roger Altman in the
Financial Times (Octo-
ber 11, 2011) has
called for a strong and
ambitious bank recapi-
talisation strategy.
Others, including Daniel
Gros in his response to
Altman, have argued
that putting capital into
banks would be wasted
money as the current
banking stress essen-
tially results from stress
related to sovereign
bonds.
Euro-area banking systems are typically highly
exposed to the sovereign of the country in which
they are located. At the same time, the exposure to
the periphery countries other than the home coun-
try is typically low. Table 1 shows the exposure of
the German, French as well as the five periphery
banking systems to the sovereigns of the five
periphery countries. The data are taken from the
EBA and measure the sovereign debt holdings of
banks, including their branches and subsidiaries. 
The most important exception to the generally low
cross-country exposure is the exposure of the
French banking system to the Italian sovereign. As
Table 1 shows, French banks hold €53 billion of Ital-
ian debt compared to €118 billion of French debt.
In a first attempt, I plot the average weekly change
in the stock market index against the total expo-
sure of sovereign holdings of all five periphery
countries in percent of the banks’ Tier 1 capital.
Figure 2 shows that no strong correlation can be
found. The graph also shows that many banks
hold sovereign debt of the five periphery countries
in excess of 100 percent of their Tier 1 capital.
As this figure does not account for differences in
the holding of the five different countries, I plot the
exposure to Greece and to Italy separately. The
Figure 3 suggests that exposure to Greece is a
significant determinant of bank market
STRESS IN THE INTERBANK MARKET has increased
significantly since July (Figure 1). There is now a
significant debate about why this is the case and
what would be the best way to address it1. Many
have argued that the sovereign debt crisis is the
most important driver of banking stress in the
euro area. If that view is correct, then the right
approach to solving Europe’s banking problem is
to solve the sovereign debt crisis. Recapitalising
banks instead would be far too costly, in particu-
lar if one wanted to cater for a haircut in Italy.
In this policy contribution, I investigate to what
extent the strong decline in bank market capital-
ization observed since July can be explained by
the exposure to sovereign debt of the five differ-
ent periphery countries. Stock prices of the 60
most important banks tested in the EBA stress
tests have fallen on average by 22 percent with
some banks losing as much as 80 percent of their
market value. I relate the stock market fall of these
60 banks to the exposure of the specific bank to
sovereign debt holdings of Greece, Portugal, Ire-
land, Spain and Italy.
Table 1: Exposure of banks to sovereigns as tested
in stress test
GR IE PT ES IT
FR 10.1 2.1 4.8 14.6 53
DE 7.9 1 3.6 18.6 36.8
GR 54.4 0 0 0 0.1
IE 0 12.5 0.2 0.3 0.8
PT 1.4 0.5 19.6 0.3 1
ES 0.4 0.1 5.5 231.7 7.4
IT 1.4 0.2 0.4 3.2 164
Source: Bruegel based on data from EBA, July 2011.
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Figure 1: Euribor-Eonia swap spread: unsecured
overnight lending becomes more expensive
Source: Bruegel based on data from Datastream.
capitalisation. However, the negative correlation is
driven by a small number of banks that hold very
large amounts of Greek debt. These are the Greek
banks themselves, and indeed the correlation is
significantly weakened when one excludes the
Greek banks from the sample (Figure 4).
In turn, exposure to Italian banks does not appear
to be a significant determinant of bank stocks val-
uation and this holds no matter whether one was
to include or to exclude Italian banks (Figure 5 and
Figure 6).
These partial correlations suggest that stock
market valuation of banks has basically not been
affected by their exposure to Italian sovereign
debt, while the exposure to Greek sovereign bonds
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Figure 3: Change in stock market index to
exposure to Greek sovereign debt in percent of
Tier 1 capital
Source: Bruegel based on data from EBA, July 2011, and
Datastream.
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Figure 4: Change in stock market index to
exposure to Greek sovereign debt in percent of
Tier 1 capital, Greek banks excluded
Source: Bruegel based on data from EBA, July 2011, and
Datastream.
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Figure 5: Change in stock market index to
exposure to Italian sovereign debt in percent of
Tier 1 capital
Source: Bruegel based on data from EBA, July 2011, and
Datastream.
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Figure 6: Change in stock market index to
exposure to Italian sovereign debt in percent of
Tier 1 capital, Italian banks excluded
Source: Bruegel based on data from EBA, July 2011, and
Datastream.
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Figure 2: Change in stock market index to total
exposure to five periphery countries in % of Tier
1 capital
Source: Bruegel based on data from EBA, July 2011, and
Datastream.
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has played a role, even though this role is mostly
an issue for the Greek banks themselves. To shed
further light on the issue and check the robust-
ness of this result, I perform a regression analy-
sis. This allows simultaneous testing of the
exposure to all five periphery countries, at the
same time controlling for the Tier 1 capital ratio
and the size of the bank as well as the location of
the bank.
The results of the regression analysis confirm
(Table 2) and refine the findings. First, I find a sig-
nificant effect of the exposure to Greek sovereign
debt (Column A). The effect is also economically
sizeable. Having an exposure to Greece amount-
ing to full tier 1 capital can explain up to half of the
loss in market value. This effect, however, is to
some extent driven by the performance of Greek
banks. Including country dummies that control for
the average stock market performance of the
banks located in the respective country removes
the significance of the Greek exposure. But even
core euro-area banks have somewhat suffered, in
particular when they were heavily exposed to
Greece. This result appears to be completely in line
with expectations. A bank holding 100 percent
worth of tier 1 capital of Greek bonds should expe-
rience a significant loss in its market value after
the announcement of a significant haircut on the
Greek debt.
Second, I find only very limited evidence that
exposure to Spain and Ireland is a determinant of
stock market valuation of banks. When I control
for the average performance of stocks per coun-
try with country dummies, I however find a small
effect (Column B). This effect appears to be driven
by the neighbouring countries, particularly Portu-
gal and Italy, and disappears when one excludes
the periphery banks themselves.
Third, when I exclude banks from the five periph-
ery countries altogether, I basically no longer find
any significant effect (Column C). This suggests
that banks in non-periphery EU countries are not
terribly affected by their exposure to the five
periphery sovereigns. This message again needs
to be made more precise. The absence of effect
only holds when one controls for the location of
the bank. In other words, bank exposure to sover-
eigns matters when one does not control for the
location of the bank (compare also to column D).
In particular, French banks have suffered from
their exposure to Italy as the negative effect on
Italian exposure disappears when one controls for
the average French performance with a French
Table 2: Regression results
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Tier 1 capital ratio -0.00351 -0.199 -0.29 -0.00417** -0.00393*
0.97 1.22 1.44 2.12 2.03
Log(risk weighted assets) 3.98e-006 -0.00452 -0.00502 -0.000313 0.000475
0 1.16 1.33 0.15 -0.23
GREECE -0.000128*** -1.2e-005 -0.000375 -0.000169* -0.000166*
4.95 0.43 0.8 1.87 1.87
IRELAND -0.00023 -0.00120** -0.00117 2.75e-005 1.67e-005
1.58 2.69 0.6 -0.02 -0.01
PORTUGAL -5.83e-005 -6.94e-005 -0.000632 0.000822 6.59e-005
0.56 0.37 0.34 -0.52 -0.04
SPAIN 3.99e-005 -0.000159** 0.000721 0.000368 0.000663
-0.69 2.13 -1.32 -0.66 -1
ITALY 2.95e-005 -7.42e-007 8.15e-006 -0.000397* -0.000309
-0.66 0.01 -0.02 1.95 1.49
Cons -0.0186 1.576 2.311 -0.012 -0.0149
1.26 -1.18 -1.42 1.26 1.56
Country dummies No Yes Yes No FR and DE only
N 57 57 32 32 32
Note: t statistics in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the ***1 percent, **5 percent or *10 percent level
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country dummy. The other banks in the EU do not
appear to have suffered from their exposure to Ital-
ian banks.
These regressions are based on gross exposure to
sovereign debt. Many banks, however, have
already hedged their exposure by insuring their
sovereign debt holdings.  I therefore re-estimated
the same regressions with the net banking book
sovereign exposure. The regression results turn
out to be even weaker, with virtually no significant
effect of this net exposure on banks’ stock market
price. I am therefore confident that the main mes-
sage of the absence of any strong effect from sov-
ereign bond holdings on banks’ stock market
valuation – with the exception of Greece – holds. 
A number of caveats are, however, in order. The
current analysis does not take account of the net-
work of exposure of banks to other banks that in
turn depends on sovereign debt. We also do not
have a measure of the available liquidity in banks,
which arguably may influence stock market valu-
ation in times of market stress. Finally, the expo-
sure to sovereign debt measures is the exposure
at the end of 2010, the cut-off date for the EBA
stress tests. Banks in the meantime may however
already have changed their exposure but it is also
true that market participants do not have more
widely disclosed information of banks’ exposure
to sovereign debt than the ones published in July
by the EBA.
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I have explored to what extent the
holding of sovereign bonds of Italy, Spain, Portu-
gal, Ireland and Greece can explain the recent
decline in stock market valuation of 60 EU banks.
More detailed analysis is needed but three results
stand out. First, exposure to Greek sovereign debt
has been a significant determinant of stock
market valuation for banks, in particular those
located in Greece. Second, exposure to Spanish
and Irish sovereign debt matters to some banks
located in the euro-area periphery countries but
core euro-area banks’ stock prices do not appear
to have been affected by their holdings of Span-
ish and Irish debt. Third, there is only very weak
evidence that exposure of core euro-area banks to
Italian debt has been a decisive variable for their
stock market valuation.
The results entail important conclusions for the
current bank recapitalisation debate. First, the
recent massive decline in market capitalisation of
banks does not appear to be driven primarily by
the banks’ holdings of sovereign bonds. It would
therefore be wrong to conceive the bank recapi-
talisation as a way to prepare banks for losses on
their sovereign debt only. On the contrary,
investors appear to accept the basic story of July
21 that only Greek bonds will face a haircut while
all other bonds will be serviced. It is of great impor-
tance to avoid a situation where investors believe
that euro-area leaders are preparing for losses on
other euro-area sovereigns. Second, there is nev-
ertheless a significant loss in market trust in
banks in the euro area. Sizeable bank recapitali-
sation could be one way of restoring trust in the
euro-area banks. However, it also appears plausi-
ble that this will not be enough. A number of fac-
tors could explain the recent mistrust of euro-area
banks. Markets might now perceive the general
business model as no longer viable given a re-
assessment of the risks.  Also, the regulatory
framework has so far rested on the assumption
that sovereign debt is risk free. A re-assessment
of this may lead to a complete overhaul of the bal-
ance-sheet composition of banks. Finally, there
now appears to be a general crisis of trust on the
part of some international investors over the via-
bility of the euro area as a whole. Euro-area lead-
ers should thus map out a credible strategy for the
institutional changes needed to render the euro-
area set-up viable. This will be the best way of solv-
ing the crisis of the euro area and its banks. 
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